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This paper tests an idea from relational contracting theory [Macauley (1963); North 
(1990); Greif (1994); Kranton (1996)] that informal relationships can substitute for formal 
contract enforcement through the judicial system, from the analysis of a new survey of the 
surgical instrument cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan. Inter-firm trust is thought to lead to reduced 
transaction costs (a passive benefit of a cluster). Considered here are exchanges of goods between 
clustered suppliers and their customers, who are either members of the cluster or firms that 
interact frequently with it. Inter-firm trust is measured as the amount of trade credit offered to 
customers.  The results show that suppliers are more likely to offer trade credit when they believe 
in the effectiveness of formal contract enforcement and when they participate in business 
networks (proxied by inter-firm communication). There is also some evidence that customer 
lock-in helps to develop inter-firm trust since firms give more credit when relationships are of 
longer duration, and as  locked-in customers are less able to find alternate suppliers.
JEL classification: 
Keywords: Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development, Transactional
        Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks.
1.   INTRODUCTION
Industrial clusters have been viewed as important in developing countries because 
they make sizeable contributions to their economies in terms of employment, output, and 
1
exports.  An industrial cluster consists of a group of firms that are specialised by sector, are 
located in close geographic proximity, and consist of mostly small and medium sized 
2
enterprises.   The benefits to firms from clustering are commonly referred to as active and 
passive collective efficiency.  Passive collective efficiency refers to benefits accruing to a 
firm by virtue of being in a cluster, such as market access, access to a large pool of skilled 
labour, technological spillovers, flexible specialisation, and reduced transaction costs. 
Active collective efficiency, on the other hand, stems from purposeful cooperation between 
3
the firms of the cluster to undertake a large-scale project to upgrade production.  
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Clusters produce a significant amount of output, with a great deal of this output bound for the export 
market. For example, India’s Palar Valley clusters produce forty-five percent of the country’s leather, where there 
are at least 600 tanneries in five clusters.  In Tiruppur, India, there were at least 2000 clustered cotton knitwear firms 
in 1995, which produced about 70 percent of India’s exports of this commodity [Banerjee and Munshi (2000)].  In 
Ludhiana, India, there were 10,000 firms and 200,000 workers producing Rs 241 billion (almost $10 billion in U.S. 
1991 dollars) of woolen knitwear in 1991 [Tewari (1999)]. In Agra, India, 5000 clustered firms were producing 
300,000 pairs of shoes per day in 1991-92 [Knorringa (1999)].
2
For example, clusters in Sinos Valley (Brazil), Agra (India), and Guadalajara and Leon (Mexico) all 
produce footwear.  Other clusters that have been studied specialise in the production of textiles, leather goods, and 
surgical instruments.
3
Schmitz and Nadvi (1999), p. 1504.
This paper empirically examines one aspect of passive collective efficiency—the 
transaction costs the clustered firms encounter in their dealings with customers and 
suppliers—using the responses from a survey of the surgical instrument cluster in Sialkot, 
Pakistan. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that relational contracting affects the amount 
of trust between firms, where trust is measured by the receipt of trade credit by customers 
from their suppliers. The firms receiving trade credit are either members of the cluster or 
firms that interact frequently with it.  
The importance of institutions, especially contract enforcement, has been well 
established in both theoretical and empirical economic literature. The absence of strong 
institutions has been recognised as a major constraint to economic growth in developing 
countries.  As Douglass North argues in his seminal work on institutions: 
…the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is 
the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary 
4
underdevelopment in the Third World.
Research has shown that in the absence of an effective legal system or formal system 
of contract enforcement, individuals and firms must rely on informal means to enforce 
agreements.  In many cases, bilateral relationships or third-party social pressure may either 
substitute for, or complement, a legal system in the enforcement of contracts. This type of 
informal enforcement of contracts is referred to as relational contracting. Relational 
5
contracts are “informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships”.  The 
methods of informal enforcement have been laid out in the New Institutional Economics 
literature and consist of the agents’ ability to sanction individuals who have reneged on their 
6
agreements without relying on the legal system.   
North (1990) presented three major methods that can be used to informally enforce 
agreements.  One method is for an agent to deal only with those who are known to them and 
can be trusted, so that trading partners are most likely to be friends and family members.  
Another approach is to develop self-enforcing agreements by dealing with the same agent 
repeatedly over an extended period of time, using the threat of breaking off the profitable 
7
trading relationship as a means to prevent the other party from cheating.  Finally, informal 
enforcement can also be carried out through community enforcement. In this situation, when 
an agent reneges on an agreement, all members of the community sanction this individual by 
refusing to trade with that agent.  To be effective, community enforcement has two major 
requirements, (i) that knowledge about cheaters is diffused through the community, and (ii) 
that other members of the community are willing to refuse to trade with a known cheater.  
Community enforcement is therefore often limited to a specific geographic area and/or to 
agents of a common cultural or social background. 
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North (1990), p. 54.
5
See Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002).
6
See Macauley (1963), North (1990), Greif (1994), Kranton (1996).  Kranton (1996) studied a theoretical 
model of reciprocal exchange, where the value of long-term relationships can support barter between two trading 
partners, and found that reciprocal exchange relationships can dominate in an economy even when they are a less 
efficient mode of exchange.  Greif (1994) explored the path dependence of contract enforcement institutions by 
examining the difference between the eleventh-century trading practices of Genoese and Maghribi traders and 
distinguished between the individualist and collectivist enforcement systems that were the precursors to modern-
day institutions.  The collectivist system, characteristic of contract enforcement institutions in developing countries 
today, relied strongly on community enforcement mechanisms and social sanctions.
7
Self-enforcing agreements may be characterised by high search costs and/or high transport costs to buy 
from alternate suppliers.  A firm must be able to identify their trading partners (i.e., know who they are trading with 
at the time of the trade) and be able to determine if a trading partner has cheated.
In practice, informal enforcement is carried out through a combination of the three 
methods described above: trust, repeated interaction, and community enforcement. The 
combination used in practice depends on the environment in which the parties are 
contracting.  The particular characteristics of clusters may make some contract enforcement 
mechanisms more effective than others.  For instance, since all firms produce similar goods, 
the threat of an individual intermediate input supplier breaking off a trading relationship with 
a manufacturer (customer) is unlikely to prevent cheating unless there is community 
enforcement due the multiplicity of similar suppliers. Therefore, we hypothesise that 
community enforcement is likely to be a stronger force than sanction by an individual firm in 
a cluster.  
Is this paper, we aim to identify the factors that influence the amount of trust 
(associated with informal contract enforcement or relational contracting), first between the 
clustered firms and their customers, and second, between clustered manufacturers and their 
intermediate input suppliers. 
Our results show that firms are more likely to offer trade credit to their customers, 
(i.e., inter-firm trust is greater) when they believe in the effectiveness of formal contract 
enforcement through the court system. There is also some evidence of customer lock-in as a 
tool for contract enforcement since suppliers are more likely to give credit and allow 
customers to pay a larger portion of their bill with delay when relationships are of longer 
duration. The hypothesised cause is that locked-in customers are less able to find alternate 
suppliers. Participation in business networks (that can be used to gather information about 
reliability and/or for social sanction) is also an effective tool in that suppliers that obtain 
information about customers through business networks are more likely to offer trade credit 
and allow customers to pay a larger portion of their bill with delay.  Additionally, customers 
are less likely to receive credit when they are visited by suppliers before the first sale. If a 
customer receives a visit from the supplier before the first sale, this may indicate that it is a 
previously unknown trading partner, and therefore not fully trusted. On the other hand, 
customers that visit their suppliers weekly are more likely to receive trade credit.  These 
visits may assist the suppliers in gathering information about the reliability of the firms as 
well as to monitor informal contracts.
This paper is presented in six sections.  In Section 1, the introduction, we have 
defined and summarised the study.  Section 2 discusses some of the empirical literature 
related to clusters.  In Section 3, the surgical instrument cluster of Sialkot (Pakistan) is 
introduced, along with the survey methodology and the estimation strategy for the relational 
contracting regressions in Section 4.  In Section 5 we discuss the results of the relational 
contracting regressions for trade credit offered to customers.  Our conclusions are presented 
in Section 5.
2. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Two earlier papers, by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson, McMillan, and 
Woodruff (2002), used an innovative survey instrument to test the hypothesis of relational 
contracting in two environments where the judicial system is not fully developed, first in 
Vietnam and then in Eastern Europe. As discussed above, informal relationships can 
substitute for third party enforcement through relational contracting. The measure of trust 
used as the dependent regression variable was the amount of trade credit that a supplier 
offered to its customers. In Vietnam, they found that the amount of trade credit given to a 
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customer is positively related to the difficulty of finding a new supplier, a longer duration of 
the trading relationship, and the identification of customers through business networks.  
Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) conducted a similar survey in five Eastern 
European countries: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.  In addition to 
relational contracting variables, they included the role of the judiciary in this second study, 
because the court systems in Eastern Europe are considered to be stronger than those in 
developing countries such as Vietnam.  Their study found that greater confidence in the court 
system made firms more likely to offer trade credit and to try new lower cost suppliers.  The 
effect of courts was greatest at the beginning of a trading relationship.
We use a methodology similar to McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson, 
McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) and apply it to data from an industrial cluster in Sialkot 
Pakistan. Our research makes a unique contribution to the literature since this aspect of 
relational contracting has not yet been studied empirically in the context of a cluster.  
In a related study, Fisman and Raturi (2000) also used trade credit data to study in ter-
firm trust, though they use a different methodology. Studying trade credit data from Africa, 
they showed how competition could encourage long-term cooperative relationships when 
trading partners must make non-contractible investments at the beginning of the 
8
relationship.
While most of the literature on the topic of industrial clusters in developing countries 
has consisted of case studies, there are a few papers that have empirically analysed the effects 
of social network-based relationships on economic activity in clusters. Woodruff’s (1998) 
case study of a shoe-producing cluster in Mexico demonstrated the importance of 
9
community sanctions for contract enforcement in a cluster.  Ilias (2001) and Banerjee and 
Munshi (2000) used empirical analysis to verify the existence and sometimes distortionary 
10
effects of these types of relationships in clusters.  This paper extends the empirical literature 
on clusters to include results on relational contracting to enforce contracts.
3.   THE SURGICAL INSTRUMENT CLUSTER IN SIALKOT:
 DESCRIPTION OF THE CLUSTER AND SURVEY
The Cluster
There is a cluster of firms consisting of approximately 220 producers and 1500 
subcontracting firms in Sialkot, a city in the Punjab province of Pakistan (see Table 1), which 
produces surgical instruments mainly for foreign markets including the United States and 
Western Europe, with 36 percent and 39 percent of instruments being exported to these 
216
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Fisman and Raturi (2000) use fixed-effects regression analysis to show that greater competition is 
associated with higher provision of trade credit.  Suppliers use trade credit in order to attract customers. Once a 
customer and supplier have invested in building trust, then the customer is “locked-in” to the relationship. 
9
Woodruff (1998) presents a case study examining the impact of trade liberalisation on the Mexican 
footwear industry, based on a qualitative analysis of surveys conducted in the Guadalajara and Leon clusters. He 
finds that trade liberalisation weakened the ability of cluster manufacturers to use informal contract enforcement 
mechanisms (reputation) with respect to retailers.
10
Ilias (2001) focuses on the role of family labour in the Sialkot surgical instrument cluster and the 
distortionary effects of the decision to use family versus non-family labour. He concludes that there existed a labour 
market distortion such that family managers are preferred to non-family and therefore firm output is correlated with 
family size.  Banerjee and Munshi (2000) present a theoretical model and empirical testing of social network-based 
lending, comparing the investment and earnings profiles of migrants and established producers (a caste called the 
Gounders) in the Tiruppur knitwear cluster in India. They find that the established producers, with access to cheaper 
informal credit through a social lending network, have lower output growth but invest more at all levels of 
experience as compared to the migrants.
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destinations respectively.   For the most part, the U.S. imports Sialkot’s disposable (single-
12
use) instruments, and Europe imports re-useable instruments.  In addition to surgical 
instruments, the cluster also produces a small amount of veterinary and manicure/pedicure 
instruments.  This cluster’s output is significant, as verified by the $124 million worth of 
13
goods exported in 2000-2001.   The firms of the cluster manufacture approximately 10,000 
14
different types of disposable and re-useable surgical instruments.  
In the cluster, production of the surgical instruments takes place in stages, including 
input production, manufacturing, and complementary services. The large vendor segment 
consists of small firms that specialise in one or more stages of the production process.  There 
is a negative correlation between firm size and the percentage of sub-contracted 
manufacturing processes, and the largest firms carry out 80-90 percent of production 
15
processes in-house.   Except for the largest manufacturers, production of a final good is not 
generally carried out in a single, vertically integrated firm.
The cluster also has local business associations, including the Metal Industries 
Development Centre, the Sialkot Dry Port Trust, the Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (SCCI) and the Surgical Instrument Manufacturer’s Association (SIMA).  
Table 1
Surgical Instrument Firms in Pakistan
Description of the Survey Instrument
For purposes of this study, we designed and commissioned a survey of the surgical 
instrument cluster in Sialkot, based in large part on the survey questionnaire developed by 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) for Vietnam and Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) 
for their study in Eastern Europe and Russia. The faculty at the Lahore School of Economics 
in Lahore, Pakistan conducted the survey. A breakdown of the entire survey sample (before 
data cleaning) is provided in Table 2.
Table 2
Survey Sample (All Firms Surveyed)
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SMEDA (2001), p. 16.
12
SMEDA (2001), p. 17.
13
SMEDA (2001), p. 13.
14
SMEDA (2001), p. 21.
15
SMEDA (2001), p. 39.
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Firms % of Sample
Employment
(No. of Workers)
Average Age of
Firms (Years)
Source: .
When the interviewer went to the cluster to begin the survey, she found that only 
about 180 of the 220 exporting firms that were listed by SIMA (the local business 
16
association) were actually in operation at that time.  Of these, 76 firms at least partially 
answered the survey, leading to a response rate of 43 percent. The interviewer then met with 
47 vendor firms in the villages surrounding Sialkot, where the cottage industry is located.  
4.  THE ANALYSIS OF RELATIONAL CONTRACTING: 
TRADE CREDIT AS A MEASURE OF INTER-FIRM TRUST
Dependent Variable: Trade Credit as a Measure of Inter-firm Trust
This study examines elements of relational contracting in the context of Sialkot’s 
surgical instrument cluster in a country where the institutional environment is characterised 
by weak third party enforcement.  
The measure of trust used as the dependent regression variable in the relational 
contracting regressions is trade credit offered to customers. More specifically, we asked each 
surveyed firm about the amount of trade credit they offered to two customers (their oldest 
17
and newest customers) and received from two suppliers (their oldest and newest suppliers).  
This approach helped to increase the number of observations and heterogeneity in the 
18
characteristics of the surveyed firms’ customers and suppliers.
In addition to questions about trade credit and the length of relationships with the 
oldest and newest customers and suppliers, firms were asked several other questions about 
the nature of their trading relationships and contract enforcement, including questions about 
their belief in the effectiveness of local courts, how often they visit customers and suppliers, 
how they were introduced to their customers and suppliers, how difficult it would be to find 
alternate customers or suppliers, and whether social sanctions existed for reneging on 
contracts.
Since the work of McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Johnson, McMillan, and 
Woodruff (2002) was not related to clusters, the particular characteristics of clusters may 
yield somewhat different results from those obtained in their studies of Vietnam and Eastern 
Europe. For instance, one of McMillan and Woodruff’s results in Vietnam was that firms 
were more likely to trust customers (and therefore offer trade credit) the more difficult it was 
for that customer to find an alternate supplier. In a cluster, manufacturing firms (as 
customers) have numerous alternate suppliers of similar (although perhaps not identical) 
intermediate inputs.  Therefore, the absence of alternate suppliers is less likely to be a 
deterrent to reneging on contracts unless intermediate inputs are highly specialised.  
Because of this, we hypothesise that information sharing and network effects are more likely 
to be significant determinants of trust and contract enforcement in a cluster environment. 
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The survey was carried out in Spring 2002.  See Appendix 3 for more details.
17
There may be a variety of reasons for offering trade credit to a customer, so that the trade credit may 
function as a source of informal credit, a way of attracting (and keeping) customers or as a means of quality 
assurance on the part of the supplier.  The terms of the trade credit may differ (the cash vs. credit price of goods, and 
the time until full payment) depending on the reason the credit is given.  While these are important issues for firms’ 
access to finance and other aspects inter-firm relationships, the focus in this paper is on “trust”.  Regardless of the 
reason for the trade credit, it will only be given when the supplier trusts that the customer will repay. 
18
As can be seen in Table A12, both exporter and vendors firms give and receive trade credit, but not in the 
same proportions.  Exporters in the sample give trade credit in greater proportions than they receive, but the reverse 
is the case among the vendors.  (Out of 53 exporters, 37 give trade credit, and 27 receive trade credit. Out of 42 
vendors, 30 give trade credit and 39 receive trade credit.)
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Regression Equations for Estimation
We estimate a model of the probability that a firm offers positive trade credit to its 
customer (where trade credit is a proxy for inter-firm trust), applying the probit estimation 
method and using the following equation:
... ... ... ... ...         (1)
where P  is the probability of offering trade credit to its customer, R is a vector representing 
i i 
factors that characterise the relationship between the firm and its customer, B  is a vector of 
i
firm characteristics, S  is a vector of customer characteristics, and Z  represents firm-level 
i i
controls.
We also estimate a model of the probability that a firm receives positive trade credit 
from its supplier, applying the probit estimation method, using the following equation.
Similarly, the regression equation for the amount of trade credit offered to customers 
(where trade credit is a proxy for inter-firm trust) took the following form: 
... ... ... ... ... (2)
where TC * is the desired level of trade credit that a firm wishes to give its customer (trade 
i
credit is defined as the percentage of the bill paid with delay).
Since we can only measure observed trade credit that is restricted to values between 0 
19
percent and 100 percent,  a tobit model is estimated such that the censored dependent 
variable takes the following form:
TC  is the observed level of trade credit, where:
i
TC = TC * for 0< TC *<1
i i i
TC =0 for TC *0
i i
TC =1 for TC *1
i i
Explanatory Variables in the Estimations
The relational contracting variables fall into four categories. First, we consider 
the lock-in of the customer or the ability of the customer to find an alternate supplier, 
which is measured by asking how long it would take a customer to find an alternate 
source if the supplier failed to deliver the inputs. The hypothesis is that “locked-in” 
customers will receive higher trade credit because it is more difficult for them to find 
alternate suppliers if they fail to pay.  Second, information gathering by firms about their 
customers may increase trade credit, which is measured by the duration of the trading 
relationship (and duration-squared to measure non-linear effects) and visits between 
suppliers and customers.  Duration may also be interpreted as customer lock-in; longer 
duration relationships may signify greater customer lock-in for a number of reasons 
including, but not limited to the following: (i) inputs may become more specialised or 
more tailored to the customer’s specifications over time, (ii) production of specialised 
219
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In the sample of trade credit offered to customers, 59 observations are censored at percent, 24 
observations are censored at 100 percent, and 49 observations are not censored.
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inputs may require a fixed investment by the supplier which is recouped over time, or (iii) 
the customer has better information about a supplier that it has been working with for an 
extended period (i.e. the customer has better information about the reliability and 
expected quality of a supplier) and becomes reluctant to change suppliers.  Third, we 
have several variables to capture the positive effects of networks in increasing trade 
credit by building trust between a firm and its customers.  These networks may assist in 
gathering information about a customer at the beginning of a trading relationship, such 
as if the firm was introduced to the customer or received information about the 
20
customer’s trustworthiness through a business or social network.  Networks may also 
increase trade credit by helping firms to sanction delinquent customers and with 
continuous information gathering, which is measured by the frequency with which the 
firm speaks to other suppliers.  Lastly, we consider the effect of the firms’ belief in formal 
and informal contract enforcement institutions on the decision to offer trade credit, as a 
way to measure the ability of firms to sanction delinquent customers. Formal contract 
enforcement is measured by a dummy variable that the respondent believes that courts 
can enforce contracts.  Informal enforcement may be measured by dummy variables 
about the respondent’s belief in the strength of social sanctions, such as the belief that 
other firms would find out about a cheating customer, or that a trade dispute would lead 
suppliers to demand higher advanced payments for inputs (in other words, less trade 
credit).  We also control for other firm level characteristics, including firm size, age, and 
whether the firm is an exporter.  
We recognise that a potential problem arises if the duration of trading 
relationships is correlated with trade credit incidence, in which case sample selection is 
based in part on the error term. Specifically, the sampling of the oldest customers and 
oldest suppliers would create a sample selection bias. There is in fact a noticeable 
difference between the average duration of the relationship with the oldest and newest 
customer and between the average duration of the relationship with the oldest and newest 
supplier (see Table 3). However, we believe that the sample selection method will not 
cause substantial bias in the estimates. There is considerable variation in the duration of 
trading relationships within-group.  Since there is considerable variation in the ages of 
firms in the cluster (from less than one year to more than forty years old), there is also 
substantial variation in the duration of the relationships (see Table 3). Among the oldest 
customers, the average duration of the relationship is 10.5 years, with a standard 
deviation of 7 years.  Among the oldest suppliers, the average relationship is almost 12 
years, with a standard deviation of more than 8 years. 
Summary statistics on the Sialkot sample in Table 4a show that the belief in the 
effectiveness of the court system is low, at an average of about 21 percent for all firms in 
the sample. In contrast, the average was about 74 percent for the Eastern European firms 
interviewed by Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002).  However, the belief in courts 
in Pakistan is relatively higher than in Vietnam, where only 9 percent of firms answered 
this question affirmatively.
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“Information through a business contact” was constructed from the responses to a question in the survey 
asking about where information was gathered about the customer at the start of the relationship, where a value of “1” 
was assigned to the following responses: other businesspeople who make products similar to the firm, other 
suppliers, or credit bureau/business association (SIMA). 
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Table 3
21
Variation in Ages and Duration of Relationships in Sample
5.  RELATIONAL CONTRACTING RESULTS I 
Trade Credit Offered to Customers
We consider the impact of the relational contracting variables on the probability that a 
clustered firm offers trade credit to its customers and the amount of trade credit offered.    
Once the dataset was cleaned and balanced, 132 observations remained for the customer 
credit regressions representing 72 unique firms in the survey. For 60 firms, there are two 
observations per firm (representing both their oldest and newest customers) and for 12 firms, 
22
there is only adequate information on one of their customers, either the oldest or the newest.  
The breakdown of firm size (by employment) in our sample was as follows:  14 firms with up 
to 10 employees, 33 firms with 11–25 employees, 12 firms with 26–50 employees, 4 firms 
with 51–100 employees, 7 firms with 101–250 employees, and 2 firms with more than 250 
employees.
Discussion of the Summary Statistics
Summary statistics on the variables used in the customer credit regressions are 
presented in Table 4a.
The most marked and obvious difference between vendors and exporters is the size of 
the firm in terms of employment (average of 15.5 versus 85 workers, respectively). 
Employment among the vendors ranges from 6 to 36 employees, and for exporters from 6 to 
585 employees. Despite this wide range, only 13 of the 71 exporters in the sample had more 
than 50 employees. The exporters are on average more mature firms as well, with an average 
age of almost 19 years, as compared to the vendors that are approximately 12 years old on 
average. Other important dimensions on which exporters and vendors differ is the reliance 
on social and business networks for introductions, with vendors relying more on the former, 
and exporters on the later.
Exporters and vendors appear to be equally locked-in to their relationships with 
suppliers, which can be seen by looking at the length of time it would take the firm to find 
221
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Note that the mean, standard deviation and median of the age variable are referring to the age of the firm 
that was surveyed, not the age of the customer or supplier. The summary statistics for age of the firm surveyed varies 
slightly between old and new customers because the two samples are slightly different; there are 8 firms for which 
there was only sufficient data for their oldest customers, and 4 firms for which there was only sufficient data for their 
newest customers.
22
When comparing firms with partial data to those with full data (variable by variable), the t-stats for 
differences in the means of the included vs. excluded observations were in most  cases insignificant. However, in the 
interest of space, these results are not reported.
Old Customers New Customers Old Suppliers New Suppliers
Age of Firm Surveyed
Mean
Std. Dev.
Median
Duration of 
Relationship
Mean
Std. Dev.
Median
Sample Size
15.2
10.4
13.0
10.5
7.0
10.0
68
17.8
11.8
14.0
2.8
3.2
2.0
52
16.3
11.1
13.5
 
 
2.7
2.6
2.0
64
16.5
11.3
13.0
11.9
8.4
10.0
61
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alternate customers for their output. On the other hand, it appears that the exporters believe 
their customers are relatively more locked-in than those of the vendors; for the vendors they 
believe that 95 percent of their customers would be able to find an alternate source of supply 
within a month, whereas the exporters believe that for nearly half of their customers it would 
take more than a month to find an alternate supplier.  
Both exporters and vendors give substantial amounts of trade credit to large shares of 
customers. Considering the firms’ oldest and newest customers, half of the exporters’ and 
nearly two-thirds of the vendors’ customers received trade credit, and the average trade 
credit given was 40 percent and 31 percent of the value of the goods respectively.  But as we 
can see in Table 4b, the amount of trade credit awarded to customers is clustered at 0 percent, 
50 percent, and 100 percent.  
Table 4a
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Average 
for 
Sample
Vendors Exporters
# Obs. 
Vendors
# Obs. 
Exporters
Total 
Number of 
Observations
Firm Age 15.73 12.16 18.80 61 71 132
Employment 52.51 15.46 84.35 61 71 132
Duration of Relationship (Years) 6.74 6.42 7.01 61 71 132
Percentage Sales to this Customer 36.54 39.49 33.26 61 55 116
Network Introduction (Business or 
Social ) (0,1)
0.55 0.68 0.44 53 61 114
Business Network Introduction (0,1) 0.19 0.04 0.31 53 64 117
Business Network for Information on 
Customer (0,1)
0.44 0.70 0.21 61 71 132
Social Network for Information (0,1) 0.13 0.08 0.17 61 71 132
Trade Credit given (0,1) 0.55 0.62 0.49 61 71 132
Time before Credit given ( Years ) 1.04 0.56 1.79 38 24 62
Trade Credit given (%) 35.91 31.15 40.00 61 71 132
Less than a Week (for Firm to Find 
Alternate Customer for Output ) (0,1)
0.15 0.15 0.15 61 67 128
More than a Month or Impossible (to 
Find Alternate Customer ) (0,1)
0.71 0.75 0.67 61 67 128
Less than a Week (for my Customer to 
Find new Supply ) (0,1)
0.30 0.21  0.38 61 71 132
More than a Week , Less than a Month  
(for my Customer to Find new Supply )
(0,1)
0.43  0.74  0.17 61 71 132
More than a Month or Impossible  (for 
my Customer to Find new Supply ) (0,1)
0.26  0.03  0.45 61 71 132
Talk to other Producers at Least Weekly 
(0,1)
0.63  0.77  0.54 33 39 72
Talk to other Producers at Least Monthly 
(0,1)
0.76  0.84  0.75 33 39 72
Has (any) Customer ever Failed to 
Deliver ? (0,1)
0.23 0.18 0.27 33 39 72
Other Customers would Find Out if I
have a Dispute with my Customer (0,1)
0.45 0.54 0.38 33 39 72
Businesses would Refuse to Deal with a 
Customer Unfair to me (0,1)
0.42 0.34 0.49 33 39 72
Local Gov’t Useful for Resolving 
Disputes with Customers (0,1)
0.14 0.13 0.15 33 39 72
I would Find out about a Dispute 
between my Customer and another 
Supplier (0,1)
0.66 0.75 0.59 32 39 71
If my Customer was Unfair with me, 
Others would Find Out (0,1)
0.45 0.40 0.49 31 37 68
Courts help Resolve Disputes with 
Customers (0,1)
0.20 0.26 0.15 33 39 72
SIMA (Trade Assoc) Good Source of info 
about Customers (0,1)
0.23 0.21 0.24 30 39 69
SIMA helps to Resolved Disputes with 
Customers (0,1)
0.22 0.28 0.17 32 39 71
Average Share of Bill Paid w/ Delay to 
Oldest and Newest Suppliers
0.42 0.51 0.33 33 39 72
Note: Dummy variables are indicated by (0,1) next to their names.
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Many firms simultaneously give and receive trade credit. Around half of vendors 
were simultaneously giving trade credit to both customers and receiving trade credit from 
both suppliers; however, this was only the case for about 20 percent of exporters (see Table 
A5). Two-thirds of exporters and nearly three-quarters of vendors gave trade credit to at least 
one of the two customers included in the survey. Nearly half of the exporters did not receive 
trade credit from either supplier, whereas this was only the case for less than 10 percent of 
vendors.
On other dimensions, particularly average duration of relationship (around 6.5 years) 
and share of sales going to a particular customer (near 40 percent), are about the same 
between the exporters and vendors. Although for each of these variables, there was 
substantial variation for both types of firms.  For vendors, the share of sales going to a 
particular customer ranged from 4 percent to 100 percent,  and for exporters the range was 
1 percent to 98 percent.  In terms of the share of sales going to a particular customer, for more 
than a third of vendors and nearly half of exporters, the particular customer accounted for 20 
percent or less of total sales.  For about another one-third of each type of firm, the particular 
customer accounted for 21–50 percent of sales.  
Exporters and vendors both have substantial belief in informal contract enforcement 
mechanisms, ranging from 34 to 75 percent. On some dimensions, vendors display greater 
trust than exporters, while on others it is reversed. Belief in the effectiveness of more formal 
dispute resolution institutions (SIMA, local government, and the courts) is significantly 
lower, at between 13 and 28 percent. Vendors appear to have somewhat more confidence 
than exporters in courts and SIMA (the trade association) for their dealings with customers.  
The most likely explanation for this (despite the vendors' small size and, therefore, clout) is 
that vendors' customers are local.  
In Table 4c, we can examine the correlations between the different enforcement 
variables. The correlations are not as high as one would expect. The formal enforcement 
variables (courts, local government, SIMA) show some correlation, ranging from 0.17 to 
0.27. There is in several cases a negative correlation between the formal and informal 
enforcement variables, showing that firms that believe strongly in one type of enforcement 
mechanism (either formal or informal) tend to have less confidence in the other form.  
Among the informal enforcement variables, the highest correlation (0.57) is between the 
variables “Other customers would find out about my dispute with a customer” and 
“Businesses would refuse to deal with a customer unfair to me”. There is also substantial 
Relational Contracting
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Distribution of Trade Credit percent across Customers
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correlation (0.29 to 0.35) between the different variables for the surveyed firm finding out 
about disputes with others or others finding out about the surveyed firm’s disputes.  
Table 4c
Correlations of Informal and Formal Enforcement Variables
Probit Results: Probability of Offering Trade Credit 
as Measure of Inter-firm Trust
Table 5 contains the results of probit estimation of variables that affect the likelihood 
that the interviewed firms offer trade credit to their customers and tobit estimates for the 
23
impact of variables on the amount of trade credit offered to customers.
The results for the “lock-in” variables are mixed. One of the variables representing 
lock-in, that it would take a month or more for customers to find alternate supplies, is 
insignificant in the regressions.  On the other hand, the duration of the trading relationship, 
which represents both lock-in and information gathering about the customer, is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level in the probit regression and at the 5 percent level in the tobit 
regression.  A one-year increase in the duration of the relationship increases the likelihood 
that a firm offers credit to its customers by about 3.5 percent, and increases by 9 percentage 
points the proportion of their bill paid with delay.  Increasing the duration of the relationship 
by one standard deviation (from 6.74 to 13.37 years) increases the probability of offering 
trade credit by about 23 percent.
McMillan and Woodruff note that the duration variable may be biased upward, since 
both initial credit and duration of a trading relationship may be correlated with the level of 
initial trust that a firm has in a new customer.  The duration variables may also theoretically 
bias the estimates of the other coefficients.  However, repeating the regressions without the 
duration variables has mostly minor impacts on the coefficient estimates.  Of the variables 
that were significant in the original regressions, only two coefficients (for control variables, 
ln(1+age) and the dummy variable for exporters) had noticeable changes in the estimates.  
These results can also be found in Table 5.
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The standard errors are made robust by correcting for the fact that data was collected about two customers 
from the same firm.  The data for two customers of the same firm is considered “clustered” so that standard errors 
are calculated under the assumption that errors are independent across firms, but not necessarily within firms, in 
other words that the observations of the customers of the same firm may be correlated.
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Obtaining information about customers through a business network appears to have a 
positive and significant impact, increasing the probability of offering credit by 26 percent 
and allowing customers to pay 44 percent more of their bill with delay.  Also, talking 
frequently with other suppliers of a customer (another way of measuring a business network) 
has a significant effect, increasing the likelihood of offering credit by 19 percent.
There is support for the hypothesis that belief in the court system increases the 
likelihood that trade credit is offered.  Firms that believe in the effectiveness of courts are 
about 30 percent more likely to offer trade credit and permit their customers to pay about 55 
percent more of their bill with delay. The variable representing community sanctions (a 
dummy variable representing the belief of the surveyed firm that other businesses would 
refuse to deal with a customer who cheated) does not have a significant effect on the decision 
to offer trade credit.  
Exporters are found to be more likely to offer trade credit to their customers and offer 
more trade credit, but the estimated coefficients are insignificant except for one of the tobit 
estimates (at the 10 percent level).  
An alternate specification of regression Equations 1a and 2a is presented in Table 6.  
In this specification, different survey questions are used to derive alternate variables for 
“lock-in,” “information and network effects” and “community enforcement.” The results are 
quite similar to the main specification in Table 5 in terms of which categories of variables are 
significant and the size of the coefficient estimates.
In all regressions, the R-squared of the Tobit regressions is low as compared to the 
probit model.  In other words, the model does better at explaining the likelihood of offering 
trade credit rather than the amount of trade credit awarded.  Given that the amount of trade 
credit offered to customers is clustered at 0, 50, and 100 percent, this is not surprising.  Also, 
the clustering of the trade credit amounts helps to explain the large magnitudes of the 
coefficient estimates in the Tobit specifications.
Given the significant differences between the exporter and vendor firms, the main 
and alternate specifications from Tables 5 and 6 were repeated, but with exporter interaction 
terms for most of the variables. These results are reported in Appendix 2, Tables A3 and A4.  
Examining these tables, the significant variables from Tables 5 and 6 maintain their sign and 
25
significance but increase in magnitude in Tables A3 and A4 as compared to Tables 5 and 6.   
In addition, the exporter interaction terms of the same variables are often of the opposite 
sign.  In other words, the significant results for some of the relational contracting variables in 
the original specifications in Tables 5 and 6 (business network for information, talking to 
other producers weekly or monthly) and the role of the courts for enforcing contracts were 
26
being driven by the vendor firms.  The exporter interaction terms, while of the opposite sign, 
are mostly insignificant. It makes sense that the dealings of the exporters with their 
(international) buyers will have different dynamics than those of the vendors, where both 
supplier and customer are located in close proximity. In particular, it makes sense that the 
role of Pakistani courts is downplayed for the exporters in their relationships with customers 
27
based abroad.   
Relational Contracting
25
An exception is duration.  When the exporter interactions are included for duration, all duration variables 
become insignificant. There were not major differences in duration between exporters and vendors, and so these 
specifications were not reported.
26
Similar results were achieved when the sample excluded firms with more than 50 employees and firm 
with more than 100 employees. Only the exporter*business refuse (informal enforcement) variable changed signs 
when firms with more than 100 employees was included.  
27
In the specifications reported here, the Exporter*court variable is negative but insignificant.  In some 
other (very similar) specifications, it gains statistical significance. 
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24
, or the “relative amount of information in prediction” for models with qualitative dependent variables 
    
was developed by Betancourt and Clague (1981). Put simply, it assesses the amount of additional information 
imparted by the inclusion of explanatory variables to the model (i.e., the introduction of a theory) relative to the 
amount of information already contained in the sample proportions. It helps to deal with some of the undesirable 
properties of traditional R2 measures as they are applied to qualitative dependent variable models, for example that 
there cannot be a decomposition of total variation and questions about the correct upper-bound for binary-choice 
statistics.
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Probit Tobit
Probit
(without 
Duration)
Tobit
(without 
Duration)
Lock-in
Would Take Customer More Than 
a Month to Find Alternate Supply
0.069
( 0.58)
0.49
(0.02)
0.074
( 0.68)
5.37
( 0.21)
Information/lock-in
Duration of Relationship (Years)
0.036
(1.91)+
9.22
(2.08)*
Duration-squared
0.00088
( 1.09)
0.24
( 1.24)
Information /
Network Effects
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network
0.26
(2.59)*
44.44
(2.10)*
0.28
(2.81)**
46.45
(2.11)*
Talk to Other Producers At Least 
Monthly
0.19
 
(2.09)*
 
27.97
(1.37)
0.18
(2.03)*
23.36
(1.12)
Enforcement
 
Businesses Would Refuse to Deal 
with Customer who Cheated 
Manufacturer
0.031
 
( 0.36)
 
25.41
( 1.45)
0.027
( 0.34)
25.01
( 1.51)
Belief in Court System
0.30
 
(3.23)**
 
55.75
(2.44)*
0.31
(3.63)**
55.04
(2.45)*
Controls
Ln(1+Age)
0.16
( 2.86)**
25.45
( 1.94)+
0.085
( 1.67)+
6.12
( 0.56)
Ln(Employment)
0.081
(2.31)*
22.67
(2.41)*
0.079
(2.42)*
24.45
(2.73)**
Export Dummy
0.059
(0.58)
41.54
(1.82)+
0.033
(0.33)
33.31
(1.50)
Observations 132 132 132 132
R-Squared 0.18 0.043 0.14 0.03
R
I Relative Amount of 
Information
in Prediction
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0.26
Not 
applicable
0.23
Not 
applicable
Chi-Squared
31.69
(dof=10)
24.09
(dof=10)
24.93
(dof=8)
16.79
(dof=8)
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.0005 0.0074 0.0016 0.032
Table 5
Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Probit and Tobit, 
Main Specification, Clustered Errors
Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1 percent, *significant at 5 percent, +significant at 10 percent.
Probit Tobit
Probit
(without 
Duration)
Tobit
(without 
Duration)
Lock-in
Would Take Customer Less 
than a Week to Find Alternate 
Supply
0.12
(1.36)
14.18
(0.91)
0.11
(1.22)
14.26
(0.87)
Would Take Customer More 
Than a Month to Find Alternate 
Supply
0.042
( 0.34)
1.32
(0.05)
0.051
( 0.45)
3.29
( 0.12)
Information / Lock-in
Duration of Relationship 
(Years)
0.034
(1.94)+
8.82
(2.07)*
Duration-squared
0.001
( 1.13)
0.22
( 1.20)
Information/
Network Effects
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network
0.24
 
(2.39)*
 
41.22
(1.96)*
0.25
(2.58)**
43.83
(2.02)*
Talk to Other Producers 
At Least Weekly
0.20
 
(2.54)**
 
28.30
(1.54)
0.20
(2.58)**
27.72
(1.47)
Enforcement
  
Customers Would Find Out 
About Dispute with Another 
Customer
0.073
 
( 0.90)
 
17.42
( 1.06)
0.073
( 0.92)
15.96
( 0.98)
Belief in Court System
0.29
(3.16)**
49.21
(2.13)*
0.30
(3.49)**
48.43
(2.09)*
Controls
Ln(1+Age)
0.16
( 2.85)**
21.57
( 1.65)+
0.079
( 1.62)
2.07
( 0.18)
Ln(Employment)
0.068
(1.65)+
19.89
(1.95)+
0.068
(1.78)+
21.71
(2.23)*
Export Dummy
0.13
(1.35)
46.87
(2.04)*
0.099
(1.06)
38.95
(1.69)+
Observations 132 132 132 132
R-Squared 0.21 0.044 0.17 0.03
R
I Relative Amount of 
Information in Prediction
0.30
Not 
applicable
0.23
Not 
applicable
Chi-Squared
36.58
(dof=11)
26.12
(dof=11)
33.45
(dof=9)
17.86
(dof=9)
Prob>Chi-Squared 0.0001 0.006 0.0001 0.037
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Table 6
Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Probit and 
Tobit, Alternate Specification, Clustered Errors
Relational Contracting
Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1 percent, *significant at 5 , +significant at 10 .percent percent
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There is also some evidence of supplier lock-in driving the provision of trade credit.  
In Table A4, the variable representing that it would take less than a week for the supplier to 
find alternate input supplies has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 10 percent 
level.  Also, some other specifications (not reported here) explicitly included a supplier lock-
in variable, signifying that it would be difficult for the firm to locate an alternate customer.  
This variable had a positive sign, and was sometimes significant.  In other words, these 
results indicate that firms appear to be offering trade credit in part to keep customers’ 
business.  
Replicating McMillan and Woodruff Specifications
We also estimate a tobit model using a similar specification to McMillan and 
Woodruff’s (1999) specifications for firms in Vietnam. These results can be found in Table 
A1 (in Appendix 2). The coefficients with the most similar results are for the duration 
variable, where estimates of the effect of increasing the length of the relationship on the 
amount of trade credit offered for both Sialkot and Vietnam are around 7–8 percent.  Also 
similar in magnitude is the replication of McMillan and Woodruff’s first regression for the 
effect of information obtained through a business network, with estimates of 26 and 20 
percent in Sialkot and Vietnam respectively.  For the effect of lock-in, age, employment and 
“price being set by the relationship with customer”, the estimated coefficients have the same 
signs as McMillan and Woodruff, but are different in magnitude.
Robustness
Additional regressions (Table A2, in Appendix 2) test for the robustness of the 
relational contracting results against alternate explanations for trade credit offered in the 
literature.  A clear hypothesis does not arise with respect to the size or age of firms and trade 
credit. If trade credit serves as a way to assure quality, then larger and older firms should offer 
28
less trade credit since they should have a lower variance in quality.  On the other hand, if 
larger and older firms have better access to formal credit sources, then they should offer more 
29 30
trade credit on average.  Trade credit may also be a price discrimination mechanism.   
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) found for Vietnam that, on average, larger and older firms 
offered less trade credit to their customers. Our results are mixed; smaller and older firms 
offer less trade credit to their customers on average.
A firm that has access to credit from formal sources, either from a bank or a credit 
association, may be more likely to offer trade credit, because it is less credit constrained.  
However, the regressions in Table A2 show that access to formal credit does not affect either 
whether trade credit is offered or the amount. The average percentage of trade credit received 
from suppliers, another source of credit that may loosen credit constraints, has a small but 
positive effect on the probability that firms offer credit to their customers (less than one 
percent) and on the amount of credit offered (also less than one percent).
In order to test the price discrimination hypothesis, McMillan and Woodruff (1999) 
used a dummy variable representing when firms set their price based on the relationship with 
the customer.  Since only one percent of the firms in our sample answered this question 
affirmatively, this variable could not be included in our specifications.  
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 See Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1993), Deloof and Jegers (1996).
29
See Peterson and Rajan (1997).
30
See Petersen and Rajan (1997).  The discussion of alternate trade credit hypotheses was taken from 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999).
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Two other variables included in the robustness regressions are a social network 
variable and an interaction variable between exporters and belief in the court system. The 
coefficient on the social network variable, in contrast to the business network variable, is not 
significant. The joint “court*exporter” variable is also not significant. In the tobit regression, 
inclusion of this interaction variable has a minor impact on coefficient estimate of the 
original variable for belief in the courts, but it is still significant at the 5 percent level. The 
likely explanation is that the exporters are unlikely to be able to rely on local courts for 
dispute resolution with international customers.
We also estimate the main specification using an alternate estimation technique to 
correct for the survey sampling method, taking into account the stratification of the sample 
(between exporters and non-exporters) and the under-representation of vendors in the 
31
sample.  Among the significant variables, the probit estimates with corrections for the 
survey sampling technique are larger in magnitude and more significant than the estimates 
that only corrected for clustered errors (except in one case). Among the significant variables 
in the tobit regressions, the estimates are more significant when corrections are made for the 
sampling technique, but are smaller in magnitude (except the dummy variable that the firm 
communicates with other firms at least monthly). The magnitudes and significance of the 
estimates calculated with this method are in general quite high, leading us to question 
whether they are in fact realistic.
32
We also re-estimate the main specifications in Table 5 using different samples.  In 
one case, a slightly smaller sample where the only observations that are included are those 
that have two customers per firm.  The results are very similar to those in Table 5, except that 
some coefficient estimates are slightly larger (in absolute value) and somewhat more 
significant. We also estimate the main specification for only the exporters in the sample.  
Except for duration of the relationship and employment, most of the variables lose 
significance when only the exporter observations are used as compared to the full sample 
that includes the vendor firms.  In addition, the effect of increasing the duration of the trading 
relationship by one year is larger in magnitude in the exporter-only sample, but only 
significant at the 10 percent level. The main specification in Table 5 was also done on 
samples of firms with 100 employees or less and 50 employees or less. The level of statistical 
significance falls with the number of observations, but the results are qualitatively the same.
6.   CONCLUSIONS
Several interesting results have been obtained regarding relational contracting as 
well as the prospects for direct marketing by clustered firms.  It was originally speculated 
that networks, rather than the lock-in of individual customers, would be the predominant 
form of contract enforcement in a cluster environment.  However, similar to McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999), both types of variables were significant in the regressions of trade credit 
offered to customers.  Since firms give more trade credit (and are more likely to give credit) 
when relationships are of longer duration, there is some evidence of lock-in as a tool for 
contract enforcement.  Business networks, that may be used to gather information about the 
reliability of customers or for social sanction, are also found to be significant correlates of 
inter-firm trust; firms that obtain information through business networks are more likely to 
offer trade credit (and offer more trade credit) to their customers. Finally, we found that firms 
31
Results not reported, but available upon request. 
32
Results not reported, but available upon request.
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are more likely to offer trade credit and to offer more trade credit to their customers when 
firms believe that the court system can help to enforce contracts. 
Without effective contract enforcement mechanisms of some kind, moral hazard can 
jeopardize the existence of transactions other than those taking place on the spot market. The 
results of this study, along with the previous results of Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 
(2002), confirm the important role of a formal system of contract enforcement (specifically 
the court system) in supporting contract enforcement, which in turn helps to reduce 
transaction costs.  Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) found that firms that believed 
in the court system were 8 percent more likely to offer trade credit and allowed customers to 
pay approximately 5.5 percent more of their bill after delivery.  In our study, we found that 
belief in the effectiveness of the court system raised the probability of offering trade credit by 
30 percent, and increasing the percentage of bill paid after delivery by 50 percentage points.  
We find however that, other than duration (which seems to be common across the 
firms), some of these results, particularly the role of business networks for information and 
the role of courts, are (logically) restricted to the vendor segment, whose customers are local.  
Industrial clusters provide employment for large numbers of people in developing 
countries, and have become significant exporters.  Case studies highlighting the successes of 
developing country clusters in these respects have led to enthusiasm on the part of 
development practitioners about the prospects of clustering as a strategy to promote private 
sector development and reduce poverty.  On the other hand, our relational contracting results 
are qualitatively (and in some cases quantitatively) similar to those obtained in studies of 
33
non-clustered firms.  Furthermore, social network-based relationships in clusters have been 
shown to have distortionary effects, as documented by Ilias (2001) and Banerjee and Munshi 
(2000). Therefore, policies to promote the development of industrial clusters should 
consider both the benefits and the drawbacks of clustering, and incorporate the lessons 
learned from these studies.
33
This is only a tentative conclusion based on a comparison of the coefficient estimates of similar 
regressions conducted of clustered (Sialkot, this study) and non-clustered firms [Vietnam, McMillan, and Woodruff 
(1999)]. We cannot directly compare the magnitudes of coefficients because there was not a joint regression of 
clustered and non-clustered firms. Conclusive results comparing contract enforcement of clustered versus non-
clustered firms would require further study. 
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Appendices
APPENDIX 1
 DATA CLEANING AND DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE
Data Cleaning
When the interviewer went to the cluster to begin interviewing firms, she found that 
only about 180 of the 220 exporting firms that were listed by SIMA (the local business 
association) as surgical instrument manufacturers were actually in operation at the time of 
the survey.  Of the exporter firms in operation, 99 returned the surveys (by mail), out of 
which 76 were actually filled out leading to a response rate of 43 percent among the 
exporters. The interviewer then met with 47 vendor firms in the villages surrounding Sialkot, 
where the cottage industry is located, to conduct face-to-face interviews.  
Data was collected on 123 firms. This meant that there was potentially information on 
246 customers and 246 suppliers.  However, some of the surveys were incomplete and 
several observations had to be dropped in order to have a balanced data set.  
Customer Credit Sample
Once the dataset was cleaned and balanced, 132 observations remained for the 
customer credit regressions representing 72 unique firms in the survey.  For 60 firms (32 
exporters and 28 vendors) there were two observations per firm (representing their oldest 
and newest customers).  For 12 firms (7 exporters and 5 vendors) there was only adequate 
information on one of their customers.  These 12 firms only provided enough information on 
the variables of interest for one of their customers, and therefore the other customer had to be 
dropped.  For the 7 exporters where there was only sufficient data on one customer, 5 had 
data on their oldest customer only and 2 had enough data only on their newest customer.  For 
the 5 vendors where there was only sufficient data on one customer, 3 had data on their oldest 
customer only and 2 had enough data only on their newest customer.
Supplier Credit Sample
Once the dataset was cleaned and balanced, 113 observations remained for the 
supplier credit regressions representing 63 unique firms in the survey. For 50 firms (31 
exporters and 19 vendors) there were two observations per firm (representing their oldest 
and newest suppliers) and for 13 firms (7 exporters and 6 vendors) there was only adequate 
information on one of their suppliers.  These 13 firms only provided enough information on 
the variables of interest for one of their suppliers, and therefore the other supplier had to be 
dropped.  For the 7 exporters where there was only data on one supplier, 6 had sufficient data 
on their oldest supplier only and 1 had enough data only on their newest supplier.  For the 6 
vendors where there was only data on one supplier, 5 had data on their oldest supplier and 1 
had sufficient data only on their newest supplier.  
Comparison of Customer Credit and Supplier Credit Samples
Since the number of observations was limited, the samples were cleaned separately 
for the customer credit regressions and the supplier credit regressions. Comparing the two 
samples, 90 of the same observations representing 53 of the same firms were included in the 
two data sets.
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Tobit
(sim. to Col. 1 
of McM-W)
Tobit
(Co1. 1 of 
McM-W)
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Tobit
(sim. to Col. 3 
of McM-W)
Tobit
(Col. 3 of 
McM-W)
Lock-in
Would Take Customer Less than a 
Week to Find Alternate Supply
–3.64
(–0.19)
–7.07
(–0.43)
Would Take Cust. More Than a 
Month to Find Alt. Supply
22.26
(0.75)
–
–
5.78
( 0.20)
No. Similar Manufacturers w/in 1 km
–0.7
(1.66)+
–1.1
(2.54)*
Most Important Competitor w/in 1 km
–13
(2.46)*
–16
(2.92)**
Information/Lock-in
Duration of Relationship (Years)
7.32
(1.64)+
8
(2.96)**
8.63
(2.01)*
7
(2.51)*
Duration-squared
–0.19
(–0.96)
 
–0.5
(2.15)*
–0.23
(.)
–0.4
(1.74)+
Info./Network Effects
 
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network
26.17
 
(1.32)
 
20
(3.36)**
27.79
(1.49)
10
(1.99)*
Talk to other Suppliers of Customer 
At Least Monthly
 19
(2.63)**
Info. About Customer Through 
Social Network
–0.55
 
(–0.02)
 
4
(0.60)
16.84
(0.67)
–8
(1.34)
Controls
Price Set by Relationship with 
Customer
50.62
(1.77)+
2
(0.53)
Customer is Retailer/Wholesaler
7
(1.62)
Ln(1+Age)
–20.28
(–1.47)
–9
(1.76)+
Ln(Employment)
26.52
(1.95)+
2
(0.98)
Manufacturer Receives Bank Credit
14.38
(0.44)
–2
(0.36)
Avg. % of Bill Paid with Delay to 
Suppliers
0.62
(2.25)*
40
(6.27)**
Observations 132 224 132 224
Chi-Squared 8.89 73.5 32.50 134.5
Prob>Chi Squared 0.18 <0.001 0.0003 <0.001
232
APPENDIX 2
ADDITIONAL REGRESSION AND DATA TABLES
Table A1
Regressions on Trade Credit to Customers, Marginal Effects, Specifications 
(Similar to McMillan and Woodruff for Research in Vietnam, Tobit with Clustered Errors)
34
We have converted McMillan and Woodruff’s results from decimals to percentages to be more easily 
comparable to our results, which accounts for the lower degree of accuracy for those results.
Theresa Thompson Chaudhry
Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1 percent, *significant at 5 , +significant at 10 .percent percent
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Table A2
Customer Credit Robustness Check, Marginal Effects, 
Main Specification, Clustered Errors
Probit Tobit
Lock-in
Would Take Customer More Than a
Month to Find Alternate Supply
–0.091
(–0.77)
–6.33
(–0.24)
Information/Lock-in
Duration of Relationship (Years)
0.035
(2.02)*
9.63
(2.23)*
Duration-squared
–0.0009
(–1.25)
–0.26
(–1.43)
Information /Network Effects
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network
0.25
(2.68)**
41.12
(1.92)+
Info. About Customer Through 
Social Network
0.014
(0.14)
13.11
(0.57)
Talk to other Suppliers of Customer 
At Least Monthly
0.12
(1.07)
23.61
(1.02)
Enforcement
Businesses Would Refuse to Deal with  
Customer Who Cheated Manufacturer  
–0.066
(–0.75)
–28.51
(–1.61)
Belief in Court System
0.27
(2.51)*
37.95
(2.00)*
Export Dummy*Belief in Courts
 
0.14
(0.79)
55.57
(1.26)
Controls
Ln (1+Age)
–0.17
(–3.33)**
–26.92
(–2.06)*
Ln (Employment)
0.053
(1.14)
16.72
(1.45)
Receive Bank Credit
–0.027
(–0.22)
13.34
(0.40)
% Trade Credit Received by Supplier
0.0046
(4.49)**
0.79
(3.04)**
Export Dummy
0.16
(1.78)+
49.21
(1.78)+
Observations 132 132
Chi-Squared
46.09
dof=14
33.84
dof=14
Prob>Chi-Squared <0.0001 0.0022
Robust z statistics in parentheses, **significant at 1percent, *significant at 5 percent, +significant at 10percent.
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Table A3
Main Specification, with Exporter Interactions
Number of Observations: 132
Pseudo R2=0.265
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Probit: 
Marginal 
Effect
Z-Stat
Lock-in
Would Take Customer More Than a 
Month to Find Alternate Supply
Information / Lock-in
Duration of Relationship (Years)
Duration-squared
Information / Network Effects
Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network
Talk to other Producers At Least Monthly
Exp*Info. About Customer Through 
Business Network
Exp*Talk to other Producers 
At Least Monthly
Enforcement
Businesses Would Refuse to Deal with 
Customer Who Cheated Manufacturer
Belief in Court System
Exp*Businesses Would Refuse to Deal 
with Customer Who Cheated 
Manufacturer
Exp*Belief in Court System
Controls
Ln(1+Age)
Ln(Employment)
Exp*Ln(1+Age)
Exp*Ln(Employment)
–0.178
0.059*
–0.002
–1.25
2.54
–1.61
0.530** 2.70
 
0.601** 2.83
–0.441 –1.60
–0.623* –2.54
–0.292 –1.38
0.445** 2.80
0.264 1.12
–0.342 –1.26
–0.641** –4.33
0.328* 2.34
0.563** 3.68
–0.224 –1.60
Robust z statistics in parentheses, Errors are clustered by firm **significant at 1 percent, *significant at 5 , 
+significant at 10 percent.
percent
Table A4
Alternate Specification, with Exporter Interactions
Number of Observations: 132
Pseudo R2 = 0.296
235
Probit: 
Marginal 
Effects
Z -Stat
Lock-in
Would Take Customer Less Than a Week to 
Find Alternate Supply
0.260 + 1.80
would Take Customer More Than a Month to 
Find Alternate Supply
–0.079 –0.53
Information / Lock-in
Duration of Relationship (Years) 0.055 * 2.31
Duration-squared –0.001 –1.42
Information / Network Effects
Info. About Customer Through Business 
Network
0.528 ** 2.64
Talk to other Producers At Least Weekly
 
0.608 ** 2.63
Exp*Info. About Customer Through Business 
Network
–0.409 –1.42
Exp*Talk to other Producers At Least 
Weekly
– 0.626 * –2.45
Enforcement
Customers would Find Out About Dispute 
with Another Customer
–0.088 –0.38
Belief in Court System 0.448 * 2.35
Exp*Customers would Find Out About 
Dispute with Another Customer
0.121 0.46
Exp*Belief in Court System –0.380 –1.25
Controls
Ln(1+Age) – 0.588 ** –3.85
Ln(Employment) 0.243 + 1.77
Exp*Ln(1+Age) 0.511 ** 3.04
Exp*Ln(Employment) –0.138 –1.01
Robust z statistics in parentheses, Errors are clustered by firm **significant at 1 percent, *significant at 5 , 
+ significant at 10 percent.
percent
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Table A5
Provision and Receipt of Trade Credit
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EXPORTERS (53 Firms)
Give to Old 
Customer 
(only)
Give to New 
Customer 
(only)
Give to 
Neither 
Customer
Give to Both 
Customers Total
Receive from Old 
Supplier (only)
2 0 0 0
2
Receive from New 
Supplier (only)
1 0 2 0
3
Receive from Neither 
Supplier
4 10 8 4
26
Receive from Both 
Suppliers
8 1 6 7
22
Total 15 11
 
16
 
11
Out of 53 exporters, 
37 give trade credit, 
and 27 receive trade 
credit.
  
VENDORS (42 Firms)
Give to Old 
Customer 
(only)
Give to New 
Customer 
(only)
Give to 
Neither 
Customer
Give to Both 
Customers
Total
Receive from Old 
Suppliers (only)
3 0 1 0
4
Receive from New 
Suppliers (only)
0 0 2 0
2
Receive from Neither 
Supplier
1 0 2 0
3
Receive from Both 
Suppliers
3 3 7 20
33
Total 7 3 12 20
Out of 42 vendors, 
30 give trade credit 
and 39 receive trade 
credit.
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